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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Insurer Liability for Damage to Realty When Payment
Would Result in Windfall Recovery
The vendor and the vendee in an executory contract for the sale
of improved real estate have the power to determine who shall bear
the risk of a casualty loss pending the closing of the contract of
sale. In the absence of any such stipulation by the parties, the
burden of the risk of loss is determined according to the rule of
law in force in the particular jurisdiction and the conditional or
unconditional nature of the contract of sale.' However, where both
parties have procured insurance against a casualty loss, substantial
problems are encountered in attempting to fix and measure the
insurer's liability to its insured.2 Depending upon the provisions
of the contract of sale, the insured vendor may be able to enforce
the payment of the contract price notwithstanding the casualty
loss. In other instances the insured vendee may avoid the contract
and recover what he has paid on the contract of sale.
Other real estate agreements raise similar problems of insurer
liability for casualty loss. In a lease agreement the lessor and lessee
may both maintain concurrent insurance on the property and one
of the parties may be under a contractual obligation to rebuild the
premises in the event of a casualty loss.3 An insured parcel of real
estate may be the subject of an appropriation proceeding with a
casualty loss intervening before the formal passage of title, and
thereafter the condemnation may be completed without adjustment
in compensation due to the loss of or damage to the improvements.4
1 The majority rule is to the effect that, after the making of an uncon-
ditional contract for the sale of real propery and before a conveyance is
made, the buyer is regarded as the equitable owner of the property and
assumes the risk of a casualty loss. The rule pre-supposes that the seller
is able to convey good title and that the loss is not due to his fault. The
minority rule places the risk of loss upon the seller. A third rule, the
"New York" rule, places the burden of the risk of loss upon the party in
possession. If the contract of sale is conditional, the risk of loss is upon
the seller until the condition is satisfied, according to the weight of authority.
West Virginia follows the majority rule. See Annot 27 A.L.R.2d 444.
2 McLoid, Allocation of Loss and Property Insurance, 39 IND. L. J. 647.3 Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 71 N.Y.S.2d
515 (1947), aff'd 287 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948).4 Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., 160 F.Supp. 487 (S.D. IM. 1957), rev'd 269
F.2d 159 (1959); Tauriello v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Supp. 530, 82 A.2d
226 (1951); Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15
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A building may be in the process of construction with both the
owner and the contractor insured, and the contractor may be under
a binding obligation to rebuild in the event of a loss.5 Similarly,
the owner may have contracted for the demolition of an insured
structure subject to the payment of a stipulated amount of salvage
and a casualty loss may intervene before the actual planned
destruction is begun or completed.'
Each of these examples raises the possibility that the insured
may realize a recovery both from the insurer and from a third party
based upon separate contracts.7 For this reason the insurers have
been quick to resort to the courts for relief from the prospect of
a windfall recovery by the insured.
Contrasting principles of indemnity have faced the courts in the
solution of the problem. On the one hand, the insured claims that
the provisions of the contract with the insured makes the value
of the property, within policy limits, the measure of the insurer's
liability, so that when a loss occurs the rights and obligations of the
parties to the contract are established. On the other hand, the
insurer argues that it need only pay its insured the amount of the
damages arising from the effects of all transactions surrounding
the loss, and if, by reason of a related transaction, the insured has
sustained no actual monetary loss, there is no liability on the policy.
Out of the litigation two divergent views have evolved; the
majority "New York" rule favorable to the insured, and the minority
'Visconsin" rule favorable to the insurer.
The New York rule follows the rationale that, in the absence
of any contractual agreement to the contrary, a fire insurance
policy is an agreement of indemnification, the premiums for which
are computed according to the value of the property and the risk
involved, so that recovery will not be denied as long as the insured
- Foley v. Manufacturers Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318(1897); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 219 Md. 217, 148 A.2d 453 (1959).6 Knuppel v. American Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1959); Federo-
wicz v. Potamac Ins. Co., 7 App. Div.2d 330, 183 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1959);
See also Board of Education v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 163, 19
S.E.2d 448 (1942).
7For a general view of judicial treatment of "windfall recovery," See
Young, Some "Windfall Coverages' in Property and Liabiliy Insurance, 60
COLuIm. L. R. 1063.8 See generally, Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1408. (1949).
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has a valid insurable interest at the time of the casualty, even
though he may obtain additional compensation by resort to the
contractual liability of a third person." The Wisconsin rule takes
the opposite stand on the question, denying recovery to the insured
where by virtue of a related transaction no actual financial loss
has been sustained by the insured from the casualty. Under the
minority rule the court "looks to the substance of the whole transac-
tion rather than to seek a metaphysical hypothesis on which to
justify a loss that is no loss.""°
The courts that espouse the majority rule dismiss the effect of
the related transaction which has permitted a double recovery to
the insured as of no concern to the insurer." The existence of
an insurable interest in the insured is generally accepted without
serious question or not disputed by the insurer. The only issues
determined are those relating to the contractual liability between
the insurer and its insured.1 2
The basis of the minority view apparently is the reluctance on
the part of the courts to allow double recovery. The premise upon
which these courts base their decisions is one of public policy i.e.,
that before an individual is entitled to be compensated under the
terms of an insurance policy it is incumbent upon him to show
that he has sustained a loss in the pecuniary sense. This is not to
say, however, that the minority view in every instance necessarily
precludes recovery on an insurance contract where at the time
of the destruction of insured real estate there is a contract of sale
9 Rutherford v. Pearl Assurance Co., 164 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1964).10 Ramsdell v. Insurance Co., 197 Wis. 136, 137, 221 N.W. 654, 655
(1928), recognized as the primary case establishing the minority view.
" Foley v. Manufacturers. Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318,
(1897).
12 Cases involving vendors and vendees in relation to the effect of a
contract of sale of insured real estate upon the liability of the insurer are
numerous. Representative cases included: Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co. v.
Maples, 37 Ala. 74, 66 So. 2d 159 (1953); First Nat'l Bank v. Boston Ins.
Co., 17 III. 2d 47, 160 N.E.2d 302 (1959); Board of Trustees v. Cream City
Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Minn. 347, 96 N.W.2d 690 (1959); Rosenbloom v. Mary-
land Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S2d 304 (1939); Paramount Fire
Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 163 Tex. 250, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962). The actual
risk of loss, by reason of a separate contract or by operation of law, may
be the burden of some person other than the litigating insured. In a con-
tract for the sale of improved real estate, an inquiry would seem to be
proper concerning the vendor's interest in the property and the manner in
which he will be benefited by its continued existence or suffer a direct pe-
cuniary injury by its loss. The vendor's interest, at most, in the above situa-
tion would appear to be the equivalent of a security interest.
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which is ultimately consummated. The vendor-vendee cases de-
cided under the minority rule may be distinguished in this sense-
that recovery has been denied only in cases where the insured was
completely protected by the terms of an existing contract of sale
from any possibility of monetary loss. To put it another way, it
would seem that minority jurisdictions will not permit an insured
to recover where under his contract of sale he has a specifically
enforceable right to demand performance of the agreement. 3
Although the minority rule is founded upon the public policy
precept that an insured ought not to be permitted to make a
profit out of a casualty loss, its legal justification is a reliance upon
the doctrine of equitable conversion for the purpose of relating the
effects of a separate agreement between the insured and a third
party to the contract of insurance. This is a fundamental weakness
in the minority view, since the necessary privity of contract between
the insurer and, for example, the vendee does not exist for the
application of the doctrine. To use the words of the Illinois
Supreme Court, "it transplants the doctrine of equitable conversion
into an area where it does not belong."1 4 Further, since the effect
of the insurer's defense is to go behind the indemnity contract
for the purpose of showing that the insured's interest in the property
is less than the stated amount of the insurance policy, the minority
rule appears to be in conflict with the provisions of the Valued
Policy Law. 5
The New York and Wisconsin rules are applied without discrimi-
nation or distinction as to the types of facts involved in the par-
13 Compare Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 163 Tex. 250,
353 S.W.2d 841 (1962), with Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 219 Md. 217,
148 A.2d 453 (1959). The majority view, on the other hand, does not dis-
tinguish between srecifically enforceable contracts and those which are not.
Compare First Nat l Bank v. Insurance Co., 17 Ill, 2d 47, 160 N.E.2d 302(1959), with Rosenbloom v. Insurance Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 N.Y.S.2d
304 (1939). Recovery is permitted in either case as long as the insured is
found to have a valid insurable interest at the time of the loss.14 First Nat'l Bank v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill.2d 147, 150, 160 N.E.2d
802, 804 (1959).
'sThe Valued Policy Law as enacted in most states provides that the
face amount of the policy, in the absence of fraud or other special defense,
shall be conclusive as to the amount of recovery in case of a total destruction
of the insured property. 15 Couch on Insurance 2d § 54.60; Maynard v. In-
surance Co., 147 W. Va. 539, 129 S.E.2d 443 (1963), discussing the West
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ticular case. The genesis of the New York rule is generally at-
tributed to a case involving the insured owner ,of a building which
suffered a casualty during construction. The contractor was
obligated to complete the building.'6 This case has been cited as
binding authority for a recovery on behalf of an insured lessee
whose lessor was also bound to restore the damaged leasehold
improvements and did so.'" In turn, this second case has been
accepted as the leading case laying down the New York rule and
has been applied as authority for granting recovery to a vendor
whose pre-existing contract for the sale of insured realty was fully
consummated after the casualty."8 In a similar manner, Ramsdell
v. Insurance Co. of North America,'9 the leading minority rule case,
arose out of the claim of an insured lessor for the proceeds of his
insurance policy although his lessee maintained concurrent in-
surance on the damaged leasehold improvements and restored the
improvements with the proceeds of his insurance. In spite of the
language of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that its ruling was
influenced by the fact that both insurers reserved by contract the
election to restore the premises in lieu of money damages and that
a double recovery would restrict the insurer's right to limit their
liability by contract, this case is cited as authority for the proposi-
tion of "one building insured, one fire and one loss . . . ." by other
courts of minority jurisdictions."
It would seem that use of only one rule, particularly in the
minority jurisdictions, is too restricted to cover all types of cases,
and that different concepts of risk of loss exist between a vendor
and a vendee than those involved in a leasehold agreement or
a construction contract. One possible explanation for this uniform
application of one rule to many varied situations is that the courts
following the majority rule dismiss the related transaction as having
no significance, while the courts committed to the minority rule
regard the related agreement as crucial to a right of recovery.
The majority jurisdictions, on the one hand, examine the factual
'
6 Foley v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897).
'
7 Alexandra Restaurant, Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 71 N.Y.S.2d
515 (1947), aff'd 287 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948).
18 Rutherford v. Pearl Assurance Co., 164 SO.2d 213 (Fla. 1964).
19 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928).
20 Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 219 Md. 217, 148 A.2d 453 (1959);
Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 163 Tex. 250, 353 S.W.2d 841
(1962). States following the minority rule include Texas, New Jersey, Mary-
land, Wisconsin and California.
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situation before them as it appeared at the time of the casualty
when the effect of the related transaction could be predicted but
could not be definitely known, while the courts committed to the
minority view regard the situation as it exists at the time of the
litigation, when the full effect of the related transaction is known.
The variance between the two views arises for these reasons. The
majority view by prohibiting the assertion of the defense of a
consummation of a related contract and the absence of pecuniary
loss precludes consideration of the insured's contract with a third
party. When the insurance contract is thus approached by the
court in isolation, recovery is permitted. However, under the
minority rationale, once the defense is asserted and considerations
extraneous to the insurance contract are added, the issues of double
recovery and "windfall" are necessarily raised, and the policy
against "unjust enrichment" prohibits recovery.
Instead of approaching these insurance cases involving related
transactions with an eye to distinguishing the majority and minority
views, these cases might properly be viewed in the light of juris-
dictional definitions of risk of loss and insurable interest. The
minority view in particular is difficult to rationalize based upon a
given statutory definition of "insurable interest." Perhaps it is for
this reason that most of the minority view courts never discuss the
interest of the insured in the property at the time of the casualty.
It would seem to follow logically that if the insured seeking a
recovery in a particular situation comes within the statutory
definition of "insurable interest" and the insured property is dam-
aged or destroyed, then the terms of the insurance contract alone
should govern the decision. Under the general statutory definition
there would appear to be no necessity for showing an actual pecun-
iary loss. All the insured should be required to show is that which
he demonstrated to the satisfaction of the insurer at the time the
policy was issued-that he had such an interest in the property
that he might be damnified by its damage or destruction; in other
words, that he had reason to benefit by the property's continued
existence.' Rather than impose upon the insured the burden of
rebutting an inference that he has suffered no loss, it would seem
more in harmony with the principles of contract law to require the
21 The various jurisdictional definitions of insurable interest are similar
to that of West Virginia as enacted in W. VA. CODE cb. 33, art. 6 § 3 (Michie
1966), i.e., that an insurable interest exists to the extent that the insured
"might be damnified" by the destruction of the property.
1967]
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insurer to prove a change of circumstances which relieves it of
liability. Without resort to the existence or non-existence of a
related transaction outside the insurance agreement the insurer
could prove that at the date of the alleged loss the insured no
longer had an insurable interest. If no insurable interest existed, no
recovery would be permitted. If a mere security interest were
preserved, the interest of the insured would be limited to an
actual loss.
This principle has been recognized in the minority jurisdiction
of Texas. In Paramount Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
the Supreme Court of Texas, three judges dissenting, committed
that jurisdiction to the minority view.22 In the later case of Leggio
v. Millers Natl Ins. Co., a lessor brought suit against four insur-
ance companies for a recovery on insurance policies covering his
interest in a building which was entirely destroyed by fire." The
lease agreement provided that the lessee should have the right
to tear down the existing structure and build a new one. Prior
to the date of the fire the lessee had elected to tear down the
building and the lessor had agreed, although at the time of the
fire the original structure remained. After the destruction of the
property the lessee built a structure according to his election. The
insurer claimed that at the time of the injury to the property the
lessor had no insurable interest, and that no recovery should be
allowed.
The court discussed its prior holding in Paramount that there
could be no pecuniary loss when that loss had been satisfied out
of a related transaction. Then the court concluded that the
Paramount rule could not be properly applied until it was deter-
mined whether or not, as a matter of law, the lessor had an insur-
able interest at the time of the alleged loss, a factor not discussed
in the Paramount case. In the words of the court:
If the option was effectively exercised and accepted
before the fire, appellant (lessor) would no longer have
any pecuniary interest in the continued existence of the
building, and would thus have no insurable interest. If, on
the other hand, the option was not exercised and accepted
before the fire, appellant would have continued to have
22 163 Tex. 250, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962).
23 398 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1965).
[Vol. 69
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an insurable interest because of his pecuniary interest
in the building and the lease contract and there would be
no related transaction.24
The court then found that the option was exercised and that the
lessor no longer had an insurable interest. Recovery was denied.
The Leggio decision involved a lessor-lessee arrangement, but
the same rationale would apply in a vendor-vendee or condemnation
situation. Where an option has been accepted a binding contract
comes into existence and the parties to the contract have mutually
enforceable rights. The same applies to a specifically enforceable
executory contract of sale. Once the contract is formed, although
executory, mutual rights arise and the doctrine of equitable
conversion comes into play, transforming the property in the hands
of the vendor into a security for the unpaid purchase price. Under
the statutory definition of insurable interest, none can exist in the
vendor for he has no risk of loss. His purchase price is secure.
Thus, absent any provisions in the contract of sale to the contrary,
any time the jurisdictional law provides that the vendee bears the
risk of loss the vendor has a specifically enforceable contract.
Conversely, where by contract stipulation or rule of law the risk
of loss falls upon the vendor in the event of a casualty, he stands
in very apparent danger of loss. His contract does not affect his
insurable interest in the property. Where the jurisdictional defini-
tion of insurable interest provides in essence, that for such an
interest to exist in property the individual must derive a benefit
from its continued existence, one conclusion is readily apparent.
Only where a contract of sale is specifically enforceable will the
vendor have parted with his insurable interest and be denied
recovery on his insurance, even in the minority jurisdictions. One
cannot very well have parted with his interest in property and still
be deemed to have the risk of loss should the property be de-
stroyed."
24 1d. at 610.25 A further example of this rationale is Germania Mut. Aid Ass'n v.
Schaeffer, 275 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1955) (Vendor allowed recovery on in-
surance policy after destruction of the insured realty and consummation of a
pre-existing contract of sale.) The court's decision was based on the fact
that there could have been no change in his insurable interest because the
executory contract of sale was parol and thus unenforceable by statute. To
the same effect is Alexander v. Hanover Ins. Co. 346 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.
1961), wherein the Texas court stated the proposition that an executory con-
tract not specifically enforceable will not constitute a change in interest
so as to preclude a vendor from recovering on his insurance.
1967]
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The lessor-lessee situations may be approached in the same
manner. In the first case decided under the minority rationale,
the Ramsdell case, the insurable interest of the lessor was ad-
mitted, so that there was no discussion on that point.26 But the
case may be distinguished in that the basis of the court's decision
was the reserved right of the insurer to rebuild. In the case of
Smith v. Jim Dandy Markets" the court determined that at the
date of the casualty the vendor had parted with all his interest
in the property so that recovery was denied. Under California law
a vendee in possession bears the risk of loss, since under the
Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act adopted in California in
1941 such vendee is required to perform the contract in spite of
the casualty loss.2" In other words, in Jim Dandy the vendor was
deemed to have a specifically enforceable right against his as-
signee at the date of the fire.
The rule that where either the lessor or lessee has rebuilt the
destroyed premises the other party is denied recovery on his
insurance developed out of the English case of Darrell v. Tibbitts."
Those jurisdictions applying the majority rule to the lessor-lessee
situations do so against the weight of traditional law in this area
and on the strength of their policy not to consider any contract
other than that of insurance."° The New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, in Alexandra Restaurant3 discussed the English
rule and decided the weight of authority in the jurisdiction was
contrary. The court did not discuss the question of insurable
interest, but instead stated: "Plaintiff concededly had an insurable
interest when the policy was issued and at the time of the loss."32
When viewed from the standpoint of insurable interest and risk
of loss, the'lessor-lessee cases and the cases in which a contractor
is obligated to rebuild a damaged structure have many character-
istics in common. If we postulate a situation where neither the
26 Ramsdell v. Insurance Co., 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928).
2 172 F.2d 616 (1949).
28 West Annot. Civ. Code § 1662. The tendency to accept possession
as the criterion of risk has resulted in the Uniform Vendors and Purchasers
Risk Act, U.L.A. 9(a), p. 357. To date, the act has been adopted in nine
states.
295 Q.B.D. 560 (1880).3oAnnot., 27 A.L.R.2d 444 (1953).
31 Alexandra Restaurant v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 71 N.Y.S.2d 515
(1947), aff'd 287 N.Y. 858, 79 N.E.2d 268 (1948).
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lessor nor the lessee is required to rebuild the damaged structure,
and compare it with the case where a contractor in the process of
constructing a building is not obligated to rebuild at his own cost
in the event of a casualty, it is apparent that in both instances the
owner of the structure would stand to lose a great deal if a fire
occurred. But in an opposite circumstance where lessee or con-
tractor has the obligation to repair, who has the risk of loss? Not
the owner, for he is guaranteed a sound building in any event.
Even if we determine loss as of the date of the casualty when the
building lays in ruins, the owner stands free of any loss. In this
sense the minority rule permits the court to look at the interest
of the insured separately and independently determine whether at
the date of the casualty such interest fulfills the requirements of
insurable interest, whereas the majority rule, by talking in terms
of which interests traditionally are considered to have that dignity,
is compelled to follow these traditional concepts to the granting
of recovery."3
Recently a case involving an insured vendor's right to recover
on insurance policies covering improved real estate subject to an
executory contract of sale consummated after a casualty loss came
before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. In this
case, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cameron Clay Products, the insured was the
owner of a pottery plant and had entered into contracts of insurance
totaling sixty-five thousand dollars.' 4 On September 14, 1964,
Cameron entered into an executory contract of sale, whereby until
the closing date, which was to be no later than November 30, 1964,
the vendee had the option to declare the contract void if the im-
provements on the property should be destroyed or substantially
damaged. On November 15, 1964, the property was totally de-
32 Id. at 521.
33 One case apparently inconsistent with the minority view is Evans v.
Crawford County Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Wis. 189, 109 N.W. 952
(1909), in which the Wisconsin court permitted a mortgagor to recover on
his insurance policy even though at the time the insured property was
destroyed there was a parol agreement to surrender the land contract to
the mortgagee's assignee for a consideration. The surrender took place after
the fire with no diminution of the agreed consideration. In rendering its
decision the court stated that a mortgagor had a sufficient insurable interest
to support a recovery, and that the insurer could not take advantage of con-
tractual relations between the insured and a third person to escape liability.
The court in the Ramsdell case treated that case as one of first impression,
arguably considering the Evans case inapplicable to the narrow facts before it.
34 151 S.E.2d 305 (W. Va. 1966).
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stroyed by fire. Subsequently the vendee elected to perform under
the contract, and the sale was consummated with no reduction in
the original contract price. The vendor brought suit to obtain
recovery on his insurance policies. The insurers defended, alleging
that since the contract had been completed with no reduction in
price the vendor had suffered no "loss," and therefore was entitled
to no recovery.
The court discussed the majority and minority views on the
subject of recovery on policies after consummation of an executory
contract of sale, but did not base its decision on either. In permit-
ting the vendor to recover on its insurance the court followed two
early decisions, one from the state of Virginia before the formation
of West Virginia,3" and one early West Virginia case,3" both decided
on facts the court stated to be indistinguishable from those before
it. The basis for the court's decision came from the rationale of
these prior decisions. In the words of the court in Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Morrison:
[T]he plaintiff is entitled to recover, notwithstanding the
contract of sale, and the subsequent performance of it:
1. because the purchaser, if sued in equity for specific
execution, might have set up the parol agreement to assign
the policy, and thereby entitle himself to an abatement for
the loss of the house; 2. because, by the stipulation for a
mortgage, the plaintiff retained an insurance interest in
the premises, which gave him an immediate right of action
against the insurance company upon the happening of
the loss."
The court determined that in the case before it Cameron had
not possessed a contract which was specifically enforceable, since
the vendee had the option to declare the contract void if the
property were destroyed or damaged. Furthermore, the court
proceeded to find that at the time of the fire the vendor had a valid
insurable interest. The syllabus of the court read as follows:
An executory contract to sell insured real property,
although binding the insured to convey upon the perfor-
3' Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 352 (1840).
36 McCutcheon v. Ingraham, 32 W. Va. 378, 9 S.E. 260 (1889).
37 Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 352 (1840).
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mance of certain conditions, does not affect the validity
of the insurance, and, if a loss occurs before the conditions
are performed, recovery may be had by the insured against
the insurer even though the sale is afterwards consum-
mated."
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, without com-
mitting itself to either the majority or minority views, has recog-
nized the importance of the character of the executory contract in
determining whether recovery should be permitted. In addition,
it has determined that the mere presence of an executory contract
for the sale of insured realty does not by itself extinguish an
otherwise valid insurable interest so as to preclude recovery on
insurance policies carried on real estate. While espousing neither
the majority nor minority view it has pointed out the individual
factors to be studied in arriving at any decision concerning the
same question involved in both views.
A close scrutiny of both majority and minority views indicates
that the difference between them cannot he resolved to the simple
statement that one permits the insured to recover while the other
does not. As the prior discussion has indicated, the jurisdictional
views of the concepts of insurable interest and risk of loss permeate
the decisions on both sides. The decision of the West Virginia
Court is clarifying for the reason that it points out the importance
of who bears the risk of loss in a given situation and proceeds
from there to reach its decision. While the wording of the decision
indicates that it stands on neutral ground in this so-called split
of authority, it points a way for a sound meeting of both sides.
Judith Herndon
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